In two weeks, Israel will be marking 35 years since the eruption of the crisis that brought on the Six-Day War, which created the problems that have plagued the country ever since: the occupied territories, the settlements, annexation of East Jerusalem, dominion over the Palestinians and the refugee problem. By coincidence - but quite symbolically - the Israel State Archives has just published a book entitled "Levi Eshkol, The Third Prime Minister: Selected Documents, 1895-1969."
These documents, edited by Yemima Rosenthal, most of them published for the first time, present a complex portrait of Levi Eshkol, originally Shkolnik, who immigrated to Palestine alone in 1914, at the age of 18, from a small town in the Ukraine. Represented here are all the major stations in his life: his days in Hapoel Hatzair, Mapai, the Mekorot water company, his work in promoting agricultural settlement, his term as finance minister, and finally, his election as prime minister at one of the most important junctures in Israeli history.
The man who emerges is warm and genuine, with a zest for life, but also bitter, especially after losing the defense portfolio on the eve of the Six-Day War because the public favored the more charismatic Moshe Dayan. A man of action with a sense of humor, he could also be indecisive and quick to compromise.
Some of the documents are classified. If not for the appearance of this book, the public might not have had access to them for at least another decade. They offer a rare glimpse into the decision-making process during and immediately after the Six-Day War, as well as, for better or for worse, the input of Levi Eshkol.
On June 4, 1967, after Dayan was appointed defense minister and the government voted to go to war, Eshkol wrote to the new minister in the hope of retaining some vestige of authority and influence over the army: "With the separation of the duties of the prime minister and the defense minister, now that a national coalition government has been formed, I would like to put in writing a few principles that were agreed upon orally with respect to cooperation between the prime minister and defense minister:
"a) Without the approval of the prime minister, the minister of defense will not go to war against any country, initiate a wartime military operation that deviates from the overall plans, take military action against a country which has not previously carried out an act of aggression against Israel, bomb major cities in enemy territory unless this enemy has struck Israeli cities first, or carry out retaliatory operations in response to an attack.
"b) After duly informing the defense minister, the prime minister is entitled to summon to his office the chief of staff, head of military intelligence, director-general of the defense ministry and the deputy defense minister, for the purpose of obtaining information."
No longer in charge of military affairs, Eshkol spent his days managing the diplomatic aspects of the war, reassuring President Lyndon Johnson and the U.S. administration, and reaching political decisions. He was acutely aware of the demographic implications of annexing territories with large Arab populations, but he was doubtful of Israel's chances of hanging on to any territory it might capture.
A euphoric meeting
At a meeting on the evening of June 5, the prime minister argued that the war in Sinai should take priority because "on the Jordanian front we know in advance that we will have to leave Jerusalem and the West Bank." The next day, June 6, Eshkol called several ministers into his office for a political consultation. The prevailing view was that Israel should continue to thrash the Egyptian and Jordanian armies, and then take advantage of the new situation to sign peace treaties with all the Arab countries. Later that day, Eshkol summoned the ministerial defense committee to discuss the political and military objectives of the war. In the wake of Israel's military victories in Sinai and the West Bank, the meeting was euphoric, in sharp contrast to the despondency and tension of the government sessions in the period leading up to the war.
After approving the objective in Sinai, i.e., defeating the Egyptian army, most of the talk revolved around the fighting in the West Bank, and especially the Old City of Jerusalem. While the meeting was going on, IDF troops completed their encirclement of the Old City, and a decision had to be reached on whether to breach the walls. Yigal Allon and Menachem Begin proposed conquering the Old City without delay, before the international community had time to intervene. Education minister Zalman Aran had reservations in light of the sanctity of the Old City for all religions.
Eshkol was in favor of capturing the Old City, but hesitated with regard to the West Bank: "I think we need to differentiate between the Old City, which is the corridor to our holy places and has a population of only 60,000, and the West Bank, with a population of one million," he said.
In the end, the government accepted Moshe Dayan's proposal to conquer the mountainous region between Jerusalem and Jenin, including Bethlehem, Ramallah and Nablus, and hold off entering the Old City so as not to get bogged down in heavy clashes in a populated area before the Sinai battles were over. The defense minister was also authorized to send troops into the Old City if political developments called for it.
During that same meeting, Eshkol brought up the subject of Israel's policy on Syria. With the memories of 1964-65 still etched in his mind, when the Arabs tried to divert the headwaters of the Jordan River, he thought Israel should seek control of tributaries in both Syria and Lebanon. "I wonder if this is not the time to do something about our outlying water sources - the Banias, and possibly the Litani - so that we will not have to shed more blood over this later," he said. He advocated moving into the demilitarized zone up to international lines, but said nothing of taking the Golan Heights.
Moshe Dayan did not think much of the Banias idea, but the prime minister kept coming back to it over the next two days, June 7 and 8. By now, however, he had changed his tune and was pushing for the entire Golan Heights. Dayan remained opposed. Imagine Eshkol's surprise when Dayan informed him the next day that he had ordered David Elazar, commander of the Northern Front, to conquer the Golan Heights. He had done so without consulting with the chief of staff, Yitzhak Rabin, and both the defense committee's decisions on this matter and Eshkol's letter had been ignored.
Eshkol was angry at Dayan, but forgave him because he could not object to an operation he himself supported. Minister Moshe Haim Shapira of Hapoel Hamizrahi was fiercely critical of the move, which contravened a government decision, and demanded that the operation be halted before blood was needlessly spilled. Eshkol and other ministers did not conceal their displeasure at Dayan's flouting of procedure, but they disagreed with Shapira. The committee endorsed the operation retroactively.
Biding their time
After the war, Eshkol's indecisiveness was even more apparent. He failed to adopt a forceful stance on major issues that remain a fixture of Israel's national agenda until today. Like most of his ministers, Eshkol was elated over Israel's control of the West Bank, Jerusalem's Old City and the water sources in the Golan. He was among the initiators of the speedy government decision to unify Jerusalem.
At the same time, Eshkol worried about the future. When the war was over, he believed peace could be reached with Egypt and Syria by withdrawing to the international borders and demilitarizing the Golan Heights and Sinai. He feared for the Jewish character and survival of Israel if territories with large Arab populations were retained. One of his ideas was annexing the Gaza Strip and resettling the refugees in Iraq or Sinai. He proposed drawing the border at the Jordan River, and establishing an autonomous district in Gaza to free Israel from the burden of ruling a million Arabs. Eshkol thus fathered a policy that guided the Israeli government from 1967 until 1973: the policy of biding time and avoiding decision-making, which was to become the trademark of Golda Meir.
Reuven Pedatzur of Ha'aretz revealed in May 1995 that the government voted to withdraw from the Golan Heights and Sinai on June 19, 1967. Unlike Dayan, Eshkol supported this initiative. From the protocols of the meeting, which appear in this book, Eshkol attacks Dayan for being vague.
Eshkol: "When we talk about returning territories, things have to be clear. If the MKs think they can sit here and ignore the refugee problem, and still reach some kind of agreement, let them get it out of their heads right now ... An inheritance of a million and a half Arabs falling on us out of the blue is no simple matter."
Shapira: "The refugees are now sitting in your country. Now they're your responsibility."
Eshkol: "I've said it before: There have always been population exchanges. When coexistence is difficult and countries can't live together, population exchange is the answer. We took in 100,000 Jews from Iraq, so let them take in 100,000 Arabs. They speak the same language. The mentality is the same. They have water. They have land."
Shapira: "No."
Eshkol: "Why not?"
Shapira: "Because they're citizens of this country, and now they're under your control. Why should Arabs who were born here be packed off to Iraq?"
Begin: "In Greece, Turks who were born there had to move. And it was based on an agreement."
Eshkol: "On the subject of borders, I propose annexing Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, although I wouldn't talk about them in the same breath. For Jerusalem, we would give our lives, but thinking about Gaza and 400,000 Arabs gives me heartburn."
Yigal Allon: "Judging by what we did in Jerusalem, without knowing how the world would react, I think we can allow ourselves to take some broader steps."
Eshkol: "I haven't heard any objections to annexing Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, although I still say there's a difference."
Begin: "I think we shouldn't use the word `annexation.'"
Yaakov Herzog (director-general of the Prime Minister's Office): "Maybe `inclusion' is a better word."
Later, Eshkol challenges Allon's proposal to build settlements in the territories. "I would wait with the settlement program," he says. "I know it's very popular to talk about getting down to such things right away. I know that using the `tower and stockade' approach, we can build dozens of settlements in no time. But I wouldn't rush. First let's see if we can solve the problem of the refugees who will be left in Israel if the Jordan River becomes the border. They'll have to be awarded some kind of political status, maybe autonomy or something."
By the end of the meeting, the government voted to accept Eshkol's proposals: offering Egypt and Syria peace in return for demilitarizing Sinai and the Golan Heights, establishing the Jordan River as a border, and turning the West Bank into an autonomous region. It was a secret resolution that was never made public, although the United States was informed.
Four months later, true to character, Eshkol had second thoughts on this decision and voted to overturn it. On October 30, 1967, in another secret ballot, the government rejected the principle of borders with Egypt and Syria based on international lines, and adopted instead the principle of borders determined by Israel's security needs - the approach favored by Moshe Dayan. This time around, not even the United States was informed.
|
