1. Bin Laden as role model
Benjamin Ben-Eliezer sits in his office at the Defense Ministry, growing increasingly worried: He fears that the American attack on Afghanistan will send shock waves through the Arab and Muslim countries that will not leave Israel unscathed. Of course, Ben-Eliezer has no crystal ball and, like his fellow government leaders, hasn't the slightest idea just where the United States is heading with its campaign. But vivid memories of his birthplace - Iraq - make him feel that he knows the Arab soul, and this is what makes him pessimistic about the possible consequences of the American operation.
The defense minister is troubled by the prospect of Osama bin Laden being perceived by the Arab world as a latter-day Robin Hood in a kaffiyeh, as a 21st-century Saladin come to save Islam from the danger posed by secular Western civilization. In private conversations in his office, Ben-Eliezer says that the religious-Islamic element is at the core of every Arab Muslim's sense of national identity. Bin Laden's accomplishments - particularly the successful transformation of three civilian airliners into hugely powerful bombs that killed more than 6,000 people, the economic damage that is estimated to reach $150 billion, and the casting of a sudden and dramatic pall over the Western world's lifestyle - may become sources of emulation for other Arab or Muslim leaders.
Some of the initial repercussions of this week's American strike - the domestic agitation that erupted in Pakistan, Indonesia and other Muslim countries - made Ben-Eliezer even more anxious about the possibility of bin Laden gaining the status of a role model. He expressed concern that images of the damage inflicted by the American planes and missiles, especially of Afghan casualties, would whip up an emotional storm in the big Muslim communities, including the Palestinian public in the West Bank and Gaza.
Primarily, Ben-Eliezer is worried about the various secular Arab leaderships losing control over their populations. He believes that, given events in Afghanistan, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak is concerned for the stability of his regime, and that Jordan's King Abdullah and the Saudi rulers are in a similar predicament. It's no accident that Riyadh is not acceding to American expectations that U.S. planes be allowed to take off and land in its territory.
Other members of the "kitchen cabinet" are tense about the unfolding events in Afghanistan, but they sound less worried than Ben-Eliezer; maybe because they don't share the same burden of responsibility that goes with being defense minister. Dan Meridor, for example, was heard to say this week that if the U.S. campaign against bin Laden becomes very protracted, America is likely to lose its Arab and Muslim coalition partners. It's one thing to announce that the struggle against world terror will take years and another to actually wage a prolonged battle against bin Laden and his gangs. While a broad international coalition (one that does not exist in name only) can rally around a multi-tiered effort to exterminate terror, a relentless military campaign directed solely against an adversary clad in kaffiyehs and Muslim robes won't be able to keep Arab or Muslim countries on board for long.
2. No Palestinian `Altalena'
Israeli decision makers are asking themselves what effect the events in Afghanistan will have on the Palestinian Authority. The answers that each comes up with are - how surprising - a direct outgrowth of their long-held readings of the situation. Ben-Eliezer, for instance, presumes that bin Laden's deeds are whetting Arafat's appetite and arousing his competitive impulse. The way the defense minister sees it, the Palestinian leader is not an interlocutor for a political accord, since he is inherently a revolutionary and it is this part of his character that will now increasingly come to the fore. As far as can be gathered, the prime minister shares this view of Arafat's leanings and temperament. Shimon Peres, on the other hand, is sure that the dramatic circumstances have heightened the likelihood of Israel's coming to an understanding with the PA, a chance he believed existed even before.
There were some very angry exchanges between the defense minister and the foreign minister at the meeting of Labor Party ministers held right after the Sukkot holiday. Peres complained, as usual, about the behavior of the defense establishment: Why were they destroying Palestinian hothouses? Why were they continuing to hold Abu Sneina? Why wasn't the prime minister giving him a real mandate to conduct negotiations with Arafat? Ben-Eliezer couldn't contain himself, and cited the latest statistics on the number of Palestinian terror attacks. He reproached Peres, saying that since his meeting with Arafat, 29 Israelis had been injured by Palestinian acts of violence.
Peres argued that the new international situation is changing Arafat's behavior: The United States is pressuring him to halt the terror and he is doing so, in no small measure due to Israeli urging. "We must assist the United States," proclaimed Peres. "We cannot make mistakes." When asked about the wisdom of the comparison drawn by Sharon between Czechoslovakia on the eve of World War II and Israel today, he replied that the prime minister had not consulted him before making that statement. Industry and Trade Minister Dalia Itzik pressed him: "Why do you take exception when we demand that the Palestinian Authority turn over terrorists?"
"Because they don't work for us," Peres responded. "And not only that - by publicizing our demands, we turn anyone who complies with our requests into a collaborator."
Meanwhile, Ben-Eliezer sits in his office, receiving reports about Palestinian attacks: They have not let up, and there have been over 30 within the span of 12 hours, including a foiled attempt to infiltrate a settlement in the Gaza Strip. Of the 48 master terrorists whose arrest Israel requested (on a total list of 108 names that was submitted to Arafat), only one has been placed in custody. The wanted man - Attaf Abiat - was arrested and released, then arrested and released again. Intelligence assessments say Arafat is simply toying with Israel. To the extent that he does carry out arrests, it is done for show only. This pattern of behavior merely strengthens the defense minister's estimation of the Palestinian leader: He is convinced that Arafat's ultimate goal is a Palestinian state stretching from the sea to the Iraqi border, a state that would swallow up both Israel and Jordan.
Not all the members of the kitchen cabinet share Ben-Eliezer's views. Some believe that a trend toward a decrease in the number of terror incidents is clearly discernible (This is also the American appraisal). They say that there are visible efforts on Arafat's part to rein in the terror organizations, although he would like to obtain cooperation by means of secret agreements with Hamas and Islamic Jihad rather than by the use of force. Thus, the time for the Palestinian Altalena (referring to the Israeli government's attack on a ship carrying arms for the underground Irgun Tzvai Leumi in June, 1948) has not yet arrived. But an effort will apparently be made to get all the terror groups to agree, for now, to suspend their violent activities - at least until the dust from the Pentagon and the ruins of the World Trade Center settles.
This tendency, signs of which were already visible, could be undermined by spontaneous reactions in the Palestinian street to images of American attacks on Afghan cities, as happened this week: In confrontations between boisterous demonstrators and Palestinian police forces in Gaza, 11 people were killed and about a hundred were injured (These are the numbers according to the defense establishment).
Arafat's readiness to use live ammunition to put down the riots was duly noted by the Israeli leadership: He avoids confronting Palestinians who contradict his word by planning or carrying out terror attacks against Israelis, but he does not refrain from firing upon his own people when a violation of his orders is construed as defiance of his authority.
3. Beilin's formulations
About a month ago, Le Monde Diplomatique published an eye-opening text: Yossi Beilin's proposal for a solution to the issue of the right of return, as presented to the Palestinian delegation at Taba on January 23, 2001. The document earned only scant notice, incommensurate with its genuine value. An illuminating position paper, it reveals the depth of the flexibility of the person who was the wind at Ehud Barak's back during the negotiations with Arafat, and is well worth a look.
The document is defined as Beilin's private response to the Palestinian proposal on the matter of refugees submitted to the Israeli delegation at Taba a day earlier. It should be remembered that, following the Taba summit, Beilin asserted that had the negotiators had just a few more days, the session would have concluded with a comprehensive Palestinian-Israeli agreement. These, then, were his proposals on the refugee issue:
In the opening section of the document, which presents the Israeli position on the fundamental question of the creation of the refugee problem and the degree of Israel's responsibility for it, Beilin says the following: "The State of Israel solemnly expresses its sorrow for the tragedy of the Palestinian refugees, their suffering and losses, and will be an active partner in ending this terrible chapter that was opened 53 years ago, contributing its part to the attainment of a comprehensive and fair solution to the Palestinian refugee problem.
"For all those parties directly or indirectly responsible for the creation of the status of the Palestinian refugees, as well as those for whom a just and stable peace in the region is an imperative, it is incumbent to take upon themselves responsibility to assist in resolving the Palestinian refugee problem of 1948."
The kicker comes in the next part: "Despite accepting UN General Assembly Resolution 181 of November 1947, the emergent State of Israel became embroiled in the war and bloodshed of 1948-49, which led to victims and suffering on both sides, including the displacement and dispossession of the Palestinian civilian population, who became refugees. These refugees spent decades without dignity, citizenship and property ever since.
"Consequently, the solution to the refugee issue must address the needs and aspirations of the refugees, while accounting for the realities since the 1948-49 war. Thus, the wish to return shall be implemented in a manner consistent with the existence of the State of Israel as the homeland for Jewish people, and the establishment of the State of Palestine as the homeland of the Palestinian people."
In Paragraph 6 of the document, Beilin declares support for a settlement of the refugee problem in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242 and General Assembly Resolution 194 (which recognizes the right of return). In the next part of the document, Beilin writes: "Since 1948, the Palestinian yearning has been enshrined in the twin principles of the `right of return' and the establishment of an independent Palestinian State deriving the basis from International Law. The realization of the aspirations of the Palestinian people, as recognized in this agreement, includes the exercise of their right to self-determination and a comprehensive and just solution for the Palestinian refugees, based on UNGAR 194, providing for their return and guaranteeing the future welfare and well-being of the refugees, thereby addressing the refugee problem in all its aspects."
He goes on to propose various programs for rehabilitating the refugees, including return, repatriation and relocation. The paper does not set the number of refugees to be given the right of return to Israel, but it does say that priority should be given to Palestinian refugees currently residing in Lebanon. And as if that weren't enough, the document declares that "The State of Israel notes its moral commitment to the swift resolution of the plight of the refugee population of the Sabra and Chatila camps."
Yossi Beilin confirms that the document was accurately quoted in Le Monde Diplomatique. In his view, had Arafat and his emissaries at Taba accepted it, an excellent solution to the right of return controversy could have been achieved. He stands by the wording that implies that the 1948 war was a "complication" of the declaration of the state, of which the refugee problem was an outgrowth, and is not at all troubled that the document contains no mention of the historical fact that the refugee problem arose as a result of the Arab armies' invasion of the brand-new state.
Beilin sees no problem in citing General Assembly Resolution 181, which outlined the partition plan, dismissing the possibility that it could be co-opted in a future Palestinian effort to shrink Israel down to the 1947 borders. He explains that the manner in which the resolution was cited actually serves the Israeli interest by alluding to the fact that Israel accepted the partition plan while the Palestinians rejected it, hinting that this is how the refugee problem was created.
As for the mention of Resolution 194, which is generally viewed as affirming the Palestinian right of return, Beilin claims that it does not say this explicitly, but rather speaks of a "desire to return" for those willing to live in peace with Israel. Hence, in his opinion, there is nothing wrong in basing a solution to the refugee problem on this resolution. Beilin reveals that, in the discussions at Taba, the number of refugees to be allowed entry to Israel was to be 25,000 in three years. It was also agreed that, for the time being, there was to be no further discussion of the number of refugees Israel would have to absorb beyond that. In any case, the initial number is double that to which Ehud Barak agreed at Camp David.
Beilin continues to believe that the document he proposed held the promise of success and is grieved that the Palestinians rejected it. Had the Palestinian delegation found it acceptable, it would have been a tremendous accomplishment for Israel, Beilin insists to this day
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